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Newspaper Interference in Judicial
Proceedings
John Vamis*
D URING A RECENT TRIAL in a court in Cleveland, a well-
known reporter for a large daily newspaper walked to the
counsel table of the prosecution, took from the table and placed
in his pocket an important document not yet introduced into
evidence by the prosecution, and walked out of the courtroom.
A short time later he was observed by an officer of the court
while in the act of returning the document. When questioned
about his action he told the court that he had taken the docu-
ment to be photostated. In explaining his actions he said that
he had not tampered with the document. He was under pressure
to meet a deadline and had chosen this method to get a preview
of what was expected to be extremely important evidence in
the case for the prosecution.'
Such conduct of a seasoned reporter, in utter disregard of
ethical and judicial rules of behavior, draws attention to three
attitudes prevailing among the gentlemen of the Fourth Estate
which have brought them into conflict with other segments of
society.
First, there is an apparent attitude of determination to "get
the news" at any cost. This is explained as the philosophy of full
exposure of the truth, whatever and wherever it may be. The
hot pursuit of news has led to some of the most exciting exploits
in the newspaper profession. It led Stanley to Livingstone.2 It
made possible a full exposure of war in all its horror, by Richard
Harding Davis.3 It told the full story of corruption in politics,
by Lincoln Steffens.4
Yet this same attitude has caused many responsible indi-
viduals to raise the question of the limits of responsible conduct
of newsmen. It has led Pope John XXIII to request regulation
of the reportedly uninhibited Italian press.5 The address by his
eminence before the Union of Catholic Jurists aroused sympathy
in at least one editorial staff here in America, which wrote:6
* MA. in Sociology, University of Chicago; MA. in Public Administration,
University of Michigan; Third year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
1 Facts reported in radio feature, "One Man's View," by William Jorgenson
during the proceedings of the first Fratantonio trial during the week of
September 8, 1960.
2 Stanley was a journalist.
3 Davis was a journalist.
4 Steffens was a journalist.
5 As reported in editorial entitled "Freedom and 'Freedom' of the Press"
in 102 America 391 (Jan. 2, 1960).
6 Ibid.
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Are the giants of the press, who preach the sacredness of
their mission with a sometimes nauseating hypocrisy, really
in favor of taking unto their own, under the banner of free-
dom of the press, the greedy and unscrupulous publishers
who flood the newsstands with the sordid advertising, the
emphasis on sex, the cheap sensationalism and the gross
invasion of privacy which aroused the protests of the Pope?
Another segment of the American scene sometimes disturbed
by over-aggressive newsmen has been the court of law. When
an overzealous publisher in the State of Colorado saw fit to differ
publicly with the motives and conduct of the State Supreme
Court in cases still pending, and lampooned the Justices in
cartoons, and published articles employing outrageous language,
he was cited for contempt of court. This case went to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, which upheld the contempt
finding.7 Justice Holmes, in his majority opinion, referred to the
freedom of the press as provided in the Constitution as a freedom
from the prior restraints practiced by other governments, and not
as a cloak for acts contrary to the public welfare. He further
contended that the administration of justice required evidence
and argument in open court free from outside influence in public
print." In his dissenting opinion Justice Harlan said that public
welfare could not override constitutional privilege. He said that
a free press should not be impaired by either legislative enact-
ment or judicial action.9 This case was tried in 1907. The 1960
Cleveland case mentioned above hardly indicates any increased
journalistic respect for the sternness of the courts.
The second attitude of an unbridled press is a belief in its
privileged status with regard to the obtaining and publishing
of news. To newspapermen this belief means a trust given to
them by the American public. This creates in the gentlemen of
the press a belief that they occupy, with respect to the sources
of their news, a status akin to that of a minister, doctor or at-
torney in his relation to his parishioner, patient or client; and
that all of the "professional" privileges should obtain. This view
was dramatically illustrated by a lady columnist of a New York
newspaper who served a ten day jail sentence for contempt of
court rather than reveal a confidential news source.10
This journalist had been subpoenaed for the purposes of a
deposition in a court of law during a civil suit brought by a
noted actress against a national broadcasting system." The in-
formation requested by the trial judge was considered essential
7 Patterson v. State of Colorado ex rel. Atty. Gen. of State of Colorado,
205 U. S. 454, 27 S. Ct. 556, 51 L. Ed. 879 (1907).
8 Ibid. at 205 U. S. 462, 463.
9 Ibid. at 205 U. S. 465.
10 As reported by the columnist in article entitled "Did I Go to Jail for
Nothing?", by Marie Torre, 23 Look 62 (May 26, 1959).
11 Garland v. Torre, 259 F. 2d 545 (C. A. 2, 1958).
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to the cause of one of the parties, and was also basic to the issue
between the parties. The journalist repeatedly refused to answer
the question, stating that she had a constitutional right which
granted her a privilege to withhold the name requested. The
journalist reported a discussion she had with a noted attorney,
Joseph Welch, during which he informed her that the constitu-
tional provision did not grant her a privilege to withhold infor-
mation in a judicial proceeding. In an article which she wrote
while in jail, she dwelt at length on the service she felt that she
had done the cause of freedom of the press.12 Her chief con-
tention in protecting the news source was that once revealed it
would destroy the confidence others might have in coming for-
ward with important news tips, which thus would be lost to the
public.
This same attitude was dramatized on an even grander scale
when a major news service raised the banner of constitutional
freedom as it applied to news distribution. The by-laws of this
news service provided that the availability of the service would
be restricted to the then existing clients in any given area. The
news service was indicted under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
as a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and com-
merce. The news service had the audacity to declare that this
application of the Sherman Act was an unconstitutional abridg-
ment of its freedom to disseminate the news. The case went
to the Supreme Court of the United States, which held that the
indictment of a monopolistic association of newspapers did not
constitute an abridgment of the freedom of the press.1 3
Thirdly, an over-aggressive activity of newsmen reflects a
lack of concern for other rights and privileges, of equal im-
portance, with which they may interfere. That this overzealous
desire to mold public opinion may even endanger the life of
an individual is demonstrated by the following sequence of
events which occurred about ten years ago in a Florida com-
munity.1 4 A seventeen year old white girl reported that she
had been raped by four Negroes at the point of a pistol. Six
days later two Negroes, alleged to be among those who committed
the crime, were indicted, and two months later were tried and
convicted without recommendation of mercy and sentenced to
death. During the trial the local newspaper published as a fact,
attributing the information to the sheriff, that the defendants had
confessed to the crime. Witnesses and persons called as jurors
said they had read or heard of this confession. This confession
was never introduced in evidence during the trial. Every detail
of violent actions of mob-rule was highlighted in the news-
paper. A mob gathered before the jail and demanded that the
12 Supra n. 10.
13 Associated Press v. U. S., 326 U. S. 1, 65 S. Ct. 1416, 89 L. Ed. 2013 (1944).
14 Shepherd v. State of Florida, 341 U. S. 50, 71 S. Ct. 549, 95 L. Ed. 740(1951).
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defendants be turned over to it; a mob burned the home of the
parents of one of the defendants; a Negro was removed from
the community to prevent his being lynched; the National Guard
was called out; and Negroes abandoned their homes and fled.
Every detail was reported in the newspaper under banner head-
lines. A cartoon was published at the time the grand jury was
sitting, picturing an electric chair and captioned "No compromise
-supreme penalty." Motions made by the defense to defer the
trial until the passion of the community had subsided, and for
a change of venue, were denied. The Florida Supreme Court, in
reviewing the evidence of guilt, saw fit to consider only the ques-
tion of which set of witnesses to believe, that is, the State's wit-
nesses or the defendants. 15
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the de-
cision on the sole ground that the method of selecting the grand
jury discriminated against the Negro race.16 However, in a
concurring opinion of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, the
press was singled out as having so abused its freedom as to
make a fair trial impossible in the locality where the trial had
been conducted. They stated that due process required that the
trial be removed to a forum free from the influence of the news-
paper.
1 7
Limitations of Freedom of the Press
Freedom of the press was guaranteed early in the history
of our nation by the adoption of the Bill of Rights. The First
Amendment specifically provides for freedom of religion, speech,
peaceable assembly and the press. It prohibits the Congress from
enacting any law which would abridge the freedom of the press.
Today this freedom is generally regarded as guaranteeing
to the press a freedom from prior restraint.'" This right was
established in the English struggle for common law rights, and
in early colonial history. It is significant that the rights associated
with this freedom were won by aggressive action of newsmen.19
Restriction by licensing persisted in Massachusetts until about
1722, when James Franklin, a publisher of that state, deliberately
satirized the government. A contempt proceeding against him
failed, and the government never again attempted to invoke
censorship.20
15 Shepherd v. State of Florida, 46 So. 2d 880 (Fla., 1950).
16 Supra n. 14.
17 Supra n. 14, 341 U. S. 50 at pp. 52-53.
18 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, N. Y., 343 U. S. 495, 72 S. Ct. 777, 96
L. Ed. 1098 (1952); Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct.
666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938); Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, Minn.,
283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1930).
19 For an excellent general discussion, see Note, Qualified Privilege to
Report Legislative and Judicial Proceedings as a Guarantee of Freedom of
the Press, 36 Va. L. Rev. 767 (1950).
20 Duniway, Freedom of the Press in Massachusetts, 102 (1906).
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In 1735, John Peter Zenger of New York published what
were considered to be seditious articles in his paper.2 ' He was
held in criminal contempt in a famous trial in which he was
ably defended by Andrew Hamilton, a leading lawyer of that
day, who argued so capably for a press unrestrained from a threat
of libel that a jury found Zenger not guilty.
In 1804, following the trial of Harry Croswell 22 , editor of
The Wasp, for criminal sedition, in which Alexander Hamilton
for the defense argued for truth and good motives as defense
against a libel action, the New York legislature passed a statute
which made truth a valid defense if the motive for publication
was good, and which gave the jury the power to determine the
fact of libel.
23
A further extension of the freedom of the press is the quali-
fied privilege in reporting legislative, executive, and judicial
proceedings. It is considered to be a qualified privilege because
it removes the threat of libel if three prerequisites are met: 24
1. The report must be of a legislative, judicial, or executive
proceeding.
2. The report must be fair and accurate.
3. It must be published without malice.
American reporters as a general rule have easy access to all
three types of hearings. Rules in the United States Congress,
as well as those of state legislatures, generally allow newsmen
access to legislative hearings. It has been a general policy of the
American law to open all trials to the public. A criminal is in
fact guaranteed a public trial by the United States Constitution. 5
Libel has been, in the past, and is today, a form of after
restraint upon the newspaper, and makes the newspaper account-
able for injury to the reputation of the individual.26 One has a
legal right to a good reputation. Civil libel may be brought
for any printed or written publication, false and unprivileged,
which directly charges or imputes to a person criminal,27 dis-
honest,28 or immoral conduct, 29 or which exposes or tends to
21 John Peter Zenger, 17 How St. Tr. 675 (1735).
22 People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 336 (N. Y., 1804).
23 Supra n. 19 at pp. 772-773.
24 Supra n. 19 at p. 776.
25 For further discussion on press coverage of criminal trials, see Ryan,
Rights and Duties of the Press in Criminal Cases, 27 Dicta 382 (1950).
26 Lassiter, Law and Press, 2 (Edwards and Broughton, Raleigh, N. C.,
1956).
27 Broking v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 76 Ariz. 334, 264 P. 2d 413, 39
A. L. R. 2d 1382 (1953); Muchnick v. Post Publishing Co., 332 Mass. 304,
125 N. E. 2d 137, 51 A. L. R. 2d 547 (1955).
28 McCue v. Equity Co-op. Pub. Co., 39 N. D. 190, 167 N. W. 225 (1918);
Bradley v. Cramer, 59 Wis. 309, 18 N. W. 268, 48 Am. Rep. 511 (1884);
(Continued on next page)
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expose him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, scorn, aversion,
shame or disgrace,3 0 or which injures or tends to injure or im-
pair his name and reputation for honesty, integrity or virtue,
3
'
or which charges him with having an infectious and contagious
disease,32 or which injures or tends to injure or prejudice him
in his trade, occupation, office, business or profession,33 or which
induces an evil opinion of him in the minds of "right thinking"
persons and tends to deprive him of the benefit of public confi-
dence and social intercourse, regardless of whether the words
actually produce such results
3 4
The remedy may be defeated by proving truthfulness of the
charges, 35 or under certain circumstances, showing that the
publication was a privileged one made in good faith without
actual malice.30
The only other form of after restraint is an order of con-
tempt issued by the court. Contempt is a willful disregard of the
authority of a court of justice or a legislative body or disobedi-
ence to its lawful orders.37 Criminal contempt is the commission
of an act tending to interfere with the administration of justice.38
(Continued from preceding page)
Kinsley v. Herald & Globe Asso., 113 Vt. 272, 34 A. 2d 99, 148 A. L. R.
1164 (1943).
29 Harshaw v. Harshaw, 220 N. C. 145, 16 S. E. 2d 666, 136 A. L. R. 1411
(1941); Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, Inc., 90 App. D. C. 156,
194 F. 2d 160, 30 A. L. R. 2d 772 (1952), cert. den. 344 U. S. 821, 73 S. Ct.
18, 97 L. Ed. 639 (1952).
30 Natchez Times Pub. Co. v. Dunigan, 221 Miss. 320, 72 So. 2d 681, 46
A. L. R. 2d 1280 (1954); Katapodis v. Brooklyn Spectator, 287 N. Y. 17,
38 N. E. 2d 112, 137 A. L. R. 910 (1941); Rose v. Daily Mirror, 284 N. Y.
335, 285 N. Y. 616, 31 N. E. 2d 182, 33 N. E. 2d 548, 132 A. L. R. 888 (1940).
31 Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F. 2d 619, 171 A. L. R. 699 (C. C. A. 7, 1947);
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 71 S. Ct.
624, 95 L. Ed. 817 (1951).
32 Springer v. Swift, 59 S. D. 208, 239 N. W. 171, 78 A. L. R. 1171 (1931);
Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. 225, 23 L. Ed. 308 (1875).
33 Yelle v. Cowles Pub. Co., 46 Wash. 2d 105, 278 P. 2d 671, 53 A. L. R. 2d
1 (1955); Myerson v. Hurlbut, 68 App. D. C. 360, 98 F. 2d 232, 118 A. L. R.
313 (1938), cert. den. 305 U. S. 610, 59 S. Ct. 69, 83 L. Ed. 388 (1938).
34 Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234, 86 A. L. R. 466 (1933);
Knapp v. Green, 123 Kan. 550, 124 Kan. 266, 256 P. 153, 259 P. 710, 55 A. L.
R. 850 (1927).
35 Lancour v. Herald & G. Asso., 111 Vt. 371, 17 A. 2d 253, 132 A. L. R.
486 (1941); Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F. 2d 806, 138 A. L. R. 15 (C. A. 2,
1940), cert. den. 311 U. S. 711, 61 S. Ct. 393, 85 L. Ed. 462 (1940); Emde
v. San Joaquin County Cent. Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 143 P. 2d 20,
150 A. L. R. 916 (1943).
36 Bailey v. Charleston Mail Asso., 126 W. Va. 292, 27 S. E. 2d 837, 150
A. L. R. 348 (1943); Bereman v. Power Pub. Co., 93 Colo. 581, 27 P. 2d 749,
92 A. L. R. 1024 (1933).
37 Black's Law Dictionary, 390 (4th Ed., 1951).
38 Walling v. Crane, 158 F. 2d 80 (C. A. 5, 1946); Kienle v. Jewel Tea Co.,
222 F. 2d 98 (C. A. 7, 1955).
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It is an act of contempt to interfere with the functioning of the
business not only of the judge39 but also of any of the officers
of the court,40 and persons such as attorneys,4 1 jurors42 and
witnesses, 43 who in the line of their duty are assisting the court
in the dispatch of its business.
In considering the effect of contempt as a check upon the
press, it is to be emphasized that newsmen have a qualified
privilege to report judicial proceedings as indicated above. How-
ever, it has on occasion brought into relief a sharp conflict be-
tween the two rights-freedom of the press and the right to a
fair trial.
Judicial Interpretation of Newspaper Interference
The Supreme Court of the United States, exercising judicial
restraint, has allowed to the newspapers wide latitude in the
reporting of judicial proceedings. Also, in decisions where the
Supreme Court has subordinated the action of the press to fair
administration of justice, the dissenting opinions have reflected
recognition of the importance of freedom of expression.
To illustrate the degree to which even the Supreme Court
will allow outside influence upon the judicial proceedings, even
where public feeling has been aroused, consider the following
California proceeding: 44 A man was convicted in that state of a
heinous sex crime. He appealed the conviction on grounds that
his conviction was based in part on a coerced confession, that a
fair trial was impossible because of inflammatory newspaper re-
ports inspired by the District Attorney, that he was in effect de-
prived of counsel in the course of his sanity hearing, that there
was an unwarranted delay in his arraignment, and that the prose-
cuting officers unjustifiably refused to permit an attorney to see
the petitioner shortly after petitioner's arrest.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the conviction,
and held that the petitioner had been defended by a vigorous
39 People v. Gholson, 412 Ill. 294, 106 N. E. 2d 333 (1952); State v. Dom-
inguez, 228 La. 284, 82 So. 2d 12 (1955).
40 Buck v. Raymor Ballroom Co., 28 F. Supp. 119 (D. C. Mass., 1939), affd.
110 F. 2d 207 (C. A. 1, 1940); U. S. v. Murray, 61 F. Supp. 415 (D. C. Mo.,
1945).
41 McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F. 2d 211 (C. A. 2, 1935),
cert. den., McCann v. Leibell, 299 U. S. 603, 57 S. Ct. 233, 81 L. Ed. 44 (1936).
42 Hawkins v. U. S., 190 F. 2d 782 (C. A. 4, 1951); State ex rel. Franks v.
Clark, 46 So.-2d 488 -(Fla. 1950); Summers v. State ex rel. Boykin, 66 Ga.
App. 648, 19 S. E. 2d 28 (1942); Dolan v. Commonwealth, 304 Mais. 325,
23 N. E. 2d 904 (1939).
43 Houston & North Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Local No. 745, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of
America, 27 F. Supp 262 (D. C. Tex., 1939); Dodd v. State, 110 So. 2d 22
(Fla. App., 1959); La Grange v. State, 153 N. E. 2d 593 (Ind., 1958); Butter-
field v. State, 144 Neb. 388, 13 N. W. 2d 572, 151 A. L. R. 745 (1943).
44 Stroble v. People of State of California, 343 U. S. 181, 72 S. Ct. 599, 96
L. Ed. 872 (1952).
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defense, which however had not availed itself of the opportunity
under California law to remove the case to another county free
of outside influence. It found further that no affidavit had been
offered to show that any juror had been prejudiced by newspaper
stories, and that all jurors had been examined so far as the
defense had desired as to any knowledge they might have about
the case. It observed also that the confession reported to the
press by the prosecutor had been read into the record at the
preliminary hearing at the municipal court. The confession would
thus have become available to the press at that time as public
property.
Precedent for this consideration for the press has been
established in a long series of decisions of the Supreme Court.
Over a period of time these cases have defined the limits of
journalistic expression. In Schenck v. United States45 , Justice
Holmes in the majority opinion stated the "clear and present
danger" rule which prevails to date. He stated: 
46
The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
In Craig v. Hecht,47 Justice Holmes in the dissenting
opinion 48 stressed the importance in the judge of restraint, im-
munity to criticism, and ability to arrive at a wise and impartial
decision in spite of petty disturbances.
In Harry Bridges v. State of California,49 Justice Black in
the majority opinion gave the widest latitude to newspaper ex-
pression. He stated that an impairment of the constitutional right
of freedom of speech and press could be justified only if the
evils were extremely serious and the degree of imminence ex-
tremely high. He further stated that the possibility of engender-
ing disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published
criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as would
justify impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and press.
Again, in Craig v. Harney,50 Justice Douglas in the majority
opinion said: r1
The history of the power to punish for contempt . . . and
the unequivocal command of the First Amendment serve
as constant reminders that freedom of speech and of the
press should not be impaired through the exercise of that
45 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919).
46 Ibid. at 249 U. S. 52, 63 L. Ed. 473.
47 263 U. S. 255, 44 S. Ct. 103, 68 L. Ed. 293 (1923).
48 Ibid. at 263 U. S. 280, 44 S. Ct. 107.
49 314 U. S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192 (1941).
50 331 U. S. 367, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 91 L. Ed. 1546 (1947).
51 Ibid. at 331 U. S. 373, 67 S. Ct. 1253.
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power, unless there is no doubt that the utterances in
question are a serious and imminent threat to the adminis-
tration of justice.
Even where the utterances made are on the borderline of
interference with judicial proceedings the Supreme Court has
said: 52
Courts must have power to protect the interests of prisoners
and litigants before them from unseemly efforts to pervert
judicial action. In the borderline instances where it is diffi-
cult to say upon which side the alleged offense falls, we think
the specific freedom of public comment should weigh heavily
against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. Free-
dom of discussion should be given the widest range com-
patible with the essential requirement of the fair and orderly
administration of justice.
Such acknowledgment, by the highest court of the land, of
the qualified privilege of the press when questioned due to pos-
sible interference with the administration of justice, should make
quite clear the high priority allowed the press. This qualified
privilege as regards the courts explains in part the usual absence
of legal action by individuals for interference by over-aggressive
reporting of individual affairs.
Individual Rights As Opposed to Freedom of the Press
It has been obvious in the reporting of news that there have
been many instances of publication which, though not libelous,
have by sensational emphasis of the spectacular or dramatic
aspects of human activity impinged upon the private rights of
individuals and organizations.
Front page coverage of such dramatic events as divorce
proceedings, a particularly sordid murder, or any event which
has appeal as news solely by reason of details which are shock-
ing, at least should be confined to straight news reporting. Cer-
tainly, the only purpose in featuring so-called human interest
details, under prominent banner headlines, is to whet the public
appetite for further titillation. When, in the Cleveland area, a
doctor was indicted and convicted of the murder of his wife, the
press not only focused upon the immediate parties in the pro-
ceedings, but their entire families, and other innocent people
associated through business or social connections were placed
under public scrutiny and comment. 53
52 Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 347, 66 S. Ct. 1029, 1037,
90 L. Ed. 1295 (1946).
53 This case aroused considerable public notice. Sheppard v. State of
Ohio, 352 U. S. 910, 77 S. Ct. 118, 1 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1956), affg. 165 Ohio St.
293, 135 N. E. 2d 340 (1956). The father of the defendant died and the
mother committed suicide.
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Although there have been many cases where a newspaper
has been held liable for invasion of privacy, 54 there have been
no cases found where a legal remedy has been sought by an
individual against a newspaper for the above indicated type of
interference with the right to fair trial. A United States Court of
Appeals did uphold a court enforcement of a rule forbidding
photographs in court rooms or the vicinity of court rooms.55 In
the opinion given by Judge Goodrich, upholding the court order,
vigorous construction was given this right of privacy.5 6
A state supreme court saw fit to overrule a contempt charge
against an aggressive broadcaster for sensational comments dur-
ing a period when a community was aroused by the commission
of two particularly horrible crimes.57 Two little girls had been
brutally killed within a relatively short time. After the second
killing, a man, subsequently charged and convicted, was appre-
hended. The temper of the community at this time was at fever
pitch. Parents were fearful of allowing their children out to
play. The broadcaster came on the air and announced, "Stand
by for a sensation!" He then proceeded to give an account of
how the man had been apprehended and charged with murder,
and went on to say that he had confessed, that he had a long
criminal record, and that he had accompanied the officers to the
scene and had reenacted the crime.
When the criminal court of the city found the broadcasting
station guilty of contempt, and fined the station for broadcasting
a matter relating to the man at a time when he was in custody
on a charge of murder, the state appeals court overruled the
contempt charge, sustaining the contention that the power to
punish for contempt is limited by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, and that the facts in the case could not support the
judgment as construed by the Supreme Court.
In refusing certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United
States58 in the opinion by Justice Frankfurter, stressed that the
refusal did not necessarily imply that the Supreme Court agreed
with the opinion of the state court. Justice Frankfurter said
that in his own opinion the problems of a democratic society
required both freedom of the press and safeguards for the fair
administration of criminal justice.
54 Pavesich v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, 69,
L. R. A. 101, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104, 2 Ann. Cas. 561 (1909); Barber v. Time,
Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S. W. 2d 291 (1942); Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136
A. 312, 51 A. L. R. 356 (1927).
55 Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F. 2d 883 (C. A., 1958),
affg. 153 F. Supp. 486 (D. C. Pa., 1957).
56 Ibid. at 254 F. 2d 885.
57 State of Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 193 Md. 300, 67 A. 2d 497
(1949).
58 State of Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U. S. 912, 70 S. Ct. 252,
94 L. Ed. 562 (1950).
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Justice Frankfurter's commentary on the interrelation of
the two rights is particularly noteworthy: 59
One of the demands of a democratic society is that the
public should know what goes on in courts by being told
by the press what happens there, to the end that the public
may judge whether our system of criminal justice is fair
and right. On the other hand our society has set apart court
and jury as the tribunal for determining guilt or innocence
on the basis of evidence adduced in court, so far as it is
humanly possible.
Justice Frankfurter may have also forecast a future con-
sideration of the infringement on the right to a fair trial under
the Fourteenth Amendment as follows: 60
Reference is made to this body of experience merely for the
purpose of indicating the kind of questions that would have
to be faced were we called upon to pass on the limits that
the Fourteenth Amendment places upon the power of States
to safeguard the fair administration of criminal justice by
jury trial from mutilation or distortion by extraneous in-
fluences. These are issues that this Court has not yet ad-
judicated. It is not to be supposed that by implication it
means to adjudicate them by refusing to adjudicate.
Conclusion
Emphasis has been put on situations which appear to indi-
cate that the press has been, at the very least, over-aggressive
in its operations. As has been shown, considerable leeway is ac-
corded the press in its activity, even where it conflicts with the
fair administration of justice. Although the courts will en-
force penalties for clear violation of the fair administration of
justice, the facts must spell out a clear and imminent danger.
As to the individual, there does not presently appear to be
any clear provision of legal remedy for newspaper interference
with individual rights, except in the civil or criminal libel action,
which does not protect individual rights against sensationalism
or over-aggressive exposure of private affairs. The invasion of
the right of privacy is an analogous but separate matter.
There appears to be a need for higher standards of ethics
and greater self restraint in the profession of journalism. Fur-
thermore, there should be greater emphasis on individual rights,
-which are certainly of importance equal to the qualified privilege
accorded to the press. And there should be a right to damages
from the press when individual rights are unlawfully invaded
by over aggressive journalism.
59 Ibid. at 338 U. S. 920, 70 S. Ct. 255-256.
60 Ibid.
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